By Dr. Mustafa Alani
Two invisible, yet formidable, wars are in progress in the world today. They are classified as low intensity wars and characterized by an unconventional, protracted confrontation through a combination of methods, including military, intelligence, and political methods. First, there is the old yet continuing war, that is ‘the war on drugs’ which was officially declared in 1971 by then US President Richard Nixon and has expanded to become part of the international community’s war against the activities of organized crime. Secondly, there is the recently declared war, ‘the global war on terrorism’ which was officially launched by the US after September 11, 2001 attacks. Both these wars have not achieved decisive victory as yet and, for the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely they will.
Organized criminal groups dealing with narcotics as well as terrorist groups are non-state actors. They are leading a war against states, or the international community, and they operate on a transnational level. Therefore, a state acting on its own is not able to play a decisive role in the progress of these wars.
In February 2004, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the main international organization in charge of counter narcotics, stated that “fighting drug trafficking equals fighting terrorism.” This statement was not an attempt to establish a direct link between the two invisible wars; rather the director was expressing concern that the recently declared war against terrorism has taken precedence over, and could be taking away much needed resources from, the war against drugs. The director emphasized that equal effort should be directed towards the war against drugs. However, the Afghan political leadership saw a means to serve their self interest by supporting the view that a link exists between the drug trade and terrorism activities. Afghan President Hamed Karzai, for example, asserted in September 2004, that there is a direct relationship between security and drugs. He blamed 3 factors for insecurity in Afghanistan: terrorism, foreign support for terrorism, and opium cultivation, which, he said, also promotes terrorist activities. President Karzai has cautioned the international community categorically by asserting, “either we kill poppies, or poppies will kill us.”
Thus the question of priority comes to the fore: Should the war on terror take precedence over the war on drugs or vice versa? The Afghan government attempted to implement a poppy eradication program with the support of the international community.
But, the program was not supported by Afghan farmers. On the contrary, the government’s ‘war on narcotics’ led to noticeable dissatisfaction among Afghan farmers resulting in increasing support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgents. Indeed, the government’s eradication program seemed to have a negative impact on the war against terrorism. It demonstrated that the war on narcotics serves the interests of terrorists and affirmed the argument that there is a direct linkage between the war on drugs and the war on terrorism.
The term ‘narcoterrorism’ was coined during the last two decades, especially to describe the violent activities of the Latin American drug cartels which aimed at influencing governments’ policies as well as societal attitudes. Narcoterrorism refers to the violent and intimidation techniques employed by drug barons and mafias in support of their narcotics production, trafficking, and distribution activities. However, narcoterrorism has nothing to do with politically or ideologically motivated terrorist activities. Violent activities are an integral part of the narcotics business, and associated violence is as old as the narcotics trade itself. However, during the last few years, and more precisely since the 9/11 attacks, a new phenomenon has drawn the attention of counter-terrorism and law enforcement authorities, that is the presumed institutionalized cooperation or alliance between “narcotics terrorism” and “political terrorism” or “ideological terrorism”. So far there is no single term to describe this new phenomenon. However, here, I’ll refer to this phenomenon as ‘Narcopolterrorism.’
In many reports and publications on terrorist groups, particularly in the political and academic literature published in the aftermath of 9/11, there are references to the “multiple links” that exist between resistance/terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates. They focus in particular on the drug lords and the assumed links between them and warlords. In fact, it is only in Latin America that evidence could be found proving the presence of strong relations between the narcotics producers/traffickers and some terrorist or militia groups, such as the Marxist FARC, AUC and ELN in Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru.
In the Middle East, hardly any writer or journalist has offered credible evidence or solid facts to prove the links between terrorists and drug lords.
Nevertheless, since 9/11, some writers on terrorism, as well as official reports produced by western government agencies or by semi-official institutions, have advanced arguments implying links between the illicit drugs trade and Islamist resistance/terrorist groups. To give one example, the Taliban movement in Afghanistan as well as its ally, the al-Qaeda, has been linked with the narcotics trade and production. While it is difficult to prove, it is a fact that the areas in which the Taliban has a strong presence, mainly in the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar as well as the Pashtun heartland in the south and the south-west/east region of the country, are also the areas which are infamous for the cultivation of opium.
Some reports have even tried to link Hezbollah of Lebanon to hashish production and trafficking. Their claims about the organization’s involvement in the drug trade are based on the fact that Hezbollah militias enjoy strong influence in and control over the main hashish production areas in southern Lebanon and the Bekaá valley near the Lebanon-Syrian border. However, apart from this geographical linkage, there is no accurate information or credible evidence to prove the truth of such claims.
Although the final objectives of organized criminal groups on the one hand, and terrorist groups on the other hand, differ, nonetheless a solid common ground and shared interests have existed between the two groups at the tactical, short term and operational levels.
First, interests converge when both groups are operating against the established authorities (or states) and the international community or the existing world order. Secondly, both groups have an interest in undermining the power and the control of the legitimate authority, weakening state institutions and law enforcement, and operating across state borders, threatening international security. Thirdly, both groups have an interest in generating funds; while the objective of the criminal groups is to make financial gains, the terrorist groups need funds to finance their operations and achieve their political and strategic objectives. Fourthly, the nature of their transnational activities makes the two groups work closely and encourages the exchange of services and experience. Thus the cooperation between the two groups is, under certain circumstances, regarded as mutual necessity.
As a general rule, drug production and narcotics trafficking has increased in the areas which are under the control of terrorist groups and vice versa. A terrorist group’s involvement in the narcotics trade could be motivated by the following factors:
(1) Monetary aim: Terrorist groups, directly or indirectly, get involved in drug production and marketing for financial gains which constitute a major source to fund their activities and support the group’s survival.
(2) Political aim: Terrorist groups could, politically and strategically, justify dealing in drugs as a means to undermine the integrity of the ‘enemy society’ of the ‘targeted state(s).’ This political objective could be achieved by providing protection and support, directly or indirectly, to drug cultivation, processing, smuggling, and marketing the illicit drugs in the ‘enemy society’ at cheap, affordable prices, through a wide distribution network with the ultimate aim of encouraging the drug habit among the youth of the targeted state(s). This would amount to a deliberate attack targeting the integrity and basic values of the ‘enemy’ society, and undermining the state’s authority and law enforcement.
(3) Logistical and technical cooperation: Terrorist groups can utilize the illegal activities of the drug traffickers, and their experience in operating against the law, to facilitate their activities and serve their objectives. By their very nature, organized criminal groups and terrorist groups are both illegal and pursuing clandestine activities. Consequently, both are targets of law enforcement forces. As a result, the groups learn techniques to counter these forces. Terrorist groups, as well as armed groups, offer protection and a safe haven for drug groups.
The interdependence between the two groups could potentially encourage the establishment of closer ties based on practical and mutual benefits. Cooperation between the two groups could come as a result of the lack of government authority in isolated enclaves and regions (mostly near international borders or in difficult and inaccessible terrain). In certain instances, terrorist groups or drug gangs decide to turn a blind eye to each other’s activities, allowing both sides to operate freely and in a secure environment. In some cases, organized drug gangs were already established in specific geographic regions when terrorist groups came, took advantage of the situation, and decided to establish themselves in that area where the government had already lost its authority and control. In other cases, terrorist groups were already in control of a specific geographic area when drug barons took advantage and established their illegal criminal activities, taking advantage of the existing safe havens, established networks and existing infrastructure.
Areas of possible cooperation:
The potential alliance between organized criminal groups and terrorist groups is based on mutual need and benefits. Organized crime groups could provide the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by offering expertise and valuable services at a highly proficient level to facilitate the activities of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups could outsource or subcontract activities and logistics needs to the organized crime groups; by doing so, terrorist groups can enjoy several advantages. They could distance themselves and avoid detection by law enforcement authorities; or, they could have the means of ensuring a better rate of success of a particular operation by obtaining logistical support from the organized crime groups that are adept at running such operations professionally. This sort of ‘farming out’ policy would allow terrorist groups to concentrate their efforts on military and political activities such as recruitment, training and political propaganda. The potential areas of cooperation could be summarized as follows:
(1) Trafficking in arms, ammunitions, explosives and trade in WMD material and exchange of know-how. This could be done by bartering drugs with weapons or other required material.
(2) Human smuggling and trafficking activities which could be utilized by terrorist groups to infiltrate international borders and smuggle terrorist elements in while avoiding border control.
(3) Contract assassinations, kidnapping and victim transfers.
(4) Money laundering and illegal funds transfer.
(5) Terrorist groups could utilize organized crime-related corruption to provide linkage with corrupt officials and law enforcement.
(6) Sub-contracting documents for forgery and counterfeit. 7) Sub-contracting information and intelligence gathering.
To conclude, the links between the war on drugs and the war on terror are evident in certain cases but not clear or proven in other cases. The involvement of Islamist resistance/terrorist groups, in particular, in the narcotics trade remains unclear. This article attempted to explore the possible links between organized crime groups and terrorist groups, based on the argument that cooperation between the two could be instituted on the basis of mutual needs and benefits. The article illustrated the argument by listing the areas of possible or potential cooperation between the two groups.
We, hypothetically at least, assume the reality of such cooperation and the development of tactical or ad hoc alliances between drug organizations and terrorists, based on the plausible assumption that both groups are united in fighting common enemies though sharply divided on strategic and final objectives. Law enforcement and intelligence authorities still lack authentic evidence to support the argument that links exist between organized criminal groups and terrorists.
The main premise of such an argument rests on facts that focus on the similarities between the two groups, the hostile environment in which they operate as well as on the nature of their transnational activities.
(ResearchSEA)
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Monday, November 27, 2006
Cyber Attacks Increasingly Target Home Users
The latest Internet Security Threat Report released by Symantec shows that because home users are less likely to have established security measures in place, they are being increasingly targeted by attackers for identity theft, fraud, or other financially motivated crime.
Furthermore, attackers are now using a variety of techniques to escape detection and prolong their presence on systems in order to gain more time to steal information, hijack the computer for marketing purposes, provide remote access, or otherwise compromise confidential information for profit.
Symantec’s Internet Security Threat Report notes that home users are the most targeted attack sector, accounting for 86% of all targeted attacks, followed by financial services businesses. Symantec has identified increased attacks aimed at client-side applications, increased use of evasive tactics to avoid detection, and that large, widespread Internet worms have given way to smaller, more targeted attacks focusing on fraud, data theft, and criminal activity.
“Attackers see end users as the weakest link in the security chain and are constantly targeting them in an effort to profit,” said Vishal Dhupar, Managing Director, Symantec India. “Symantec introduced new metrics to further understand how to better protect customers against these security concerns in years to come,” he adds.
Desktop Attacks on the Rise: As software vendors and enterprises successfully adapt to the changing threat environment by implementing security best practices and defense-in-depth strategies, attackers have begun to adopt new techniques such as targeting malicious code at client-side applications including Web browsers, e-mail clients, and other desktop applications.
Vulnerabilities affecting Web applications accounted for 69% of all vulnerabilities documented by Symantec in first half of 2006. Vulnerabilities in Web browsers have also become increasingly prominent, with 47 vulnerabilities documented in Mozilla browsers (compared to 17 in the last reporting period), 38 in Microsoft Internet Explorer (compared to 25), and 12 in Apple Safari (compared to six).
Evasive Techniques on the Rise: During this reporting period, 18% of all distinct malicious code samples detected by Symantec had not been seen before, indicating that attackers are more actively attempting to evade detection by signature-based antivirus and intrusion detection/prevention systems.
Phishers are also attempting to bypass filtering technologies by creating multiple randomized messages and distributing those messages in a broad uncontrolled fashion. During the first six months of 2006, 157,477 unique phishing messages were detected, marking an increase of 81% over the previous period. At the same time, spam made up 54% of all monitored e-mail traffic, a slight increase from 50% the previous period. Most spammers are opting to exclude malicious code with their spam to decrease the chances of being blocked and instead include links to Web sites hosting malicious code.
Financial Gain Drives Malicious Activity: Financial gain remains the motivation behind many of the threats during the reporting period. For example, bot networks can be used not only to spread malicious code, but to send spam or phishing messages, download adware and spyware, attack an organization, and harvest confidential information. Symantec identified more than 4.6 million distinct, active bot network computers and observed an average of 57,717 active bot network computers per day during this period. Bot networks are also commonly used in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, a major threat to organizations as these attacks can result in disrupted communication, loss of revenue, damage to brand and reputation, and exposure to criminal extortion schemes. During the first half of 2006, Symantec observed an average of 6,110 DoS attacks per day.
Other financially motivated attacks use modular malicious code, malware that updates itself or downloads a more aggressive threat upon establishing a foothold on the victim host, to expose sensitive information. During the first half of 2006, modular malicious code accounted for 79% of the top 50 malicious code reported to Symantec. Additionally, malicious code threats that expose confidential data represented 30 of the top 50 samples submitted to Symantec.
Furthermore, attackers are now using a variety of techniques to escape detection and prolong their presence on systems in order to gain more time to steal information, hijack the computer for marketing purposes, provide remote access, or otherwise compromise confidential information for profit.
Symantec’s Internet Security Threat Report notes that home users are the most targeted attack sector, accounting for 86% of all targeted attacks, followed by financial services businesses. Symantec has identified increased attacks aimed at client-side applications, increased use of evasive tactics to avoid detection, and that large, widespread Internet worms have given way to smaller, more targeted attacks focusing on fraud, data theft, and criminal activity.
“Attackers see end users as the weakest link in the security chain and are constantly targeting them in an effort to profit,” said Vishal Dhupar, Managing Director, Symantec India. “Symantec introduced new metrics to further understand how to better protect customers against these security concerns in years to come,” he adds.
Desktop Attacks on the Rise: As software vendors and enterprises successfully adapt to the changing threat environment by implementing security best practices and defense-in-depth strategies, attackers have begun to adopt new techniques such as targeting malicious code at client-side applications including Web browsers, e-mail clients, and other desktop applications.
Vulnerabilities affecting Web applications accounted for 69% of all vulnerabilities documented by Symantec in first half of 2006. Vulnerabilities in Web browsers have also become increasingly prominent, with 47 vulnerabilities documented in Mozilla browsers (compared to 17 in the last reporting period), 38 in Microsoft Internet Explorer (compared to 25), and 12 in Apple Safari (compared to six).
Evasive Techniques on the Rise: During this reporting period, 18% of all distinct malicious code samples detected by Symantec had not been seen before, indicating that attackers are more actively attempting to evade detection by signature-based antivirus and intrusion detection/prevention systems.
Phishers are also attempting to bypass filtering technologies by creating multiple randomized messages and distributing those messages in a broad uncontrolled fashion. During the first six months of 2006, 157,477 unique phishing messages were detected, marking an increase of 81% over the previous period. At the same time, spam made up 54% of all monitored e-mail traffic, a slight increase from 50% the previous period. Most spammers are opting to exclude malicious code with their spam to decrease the chances of being blocked and instead include links to Web sites hosting malicious code.
Financial Gain Drives Malicious Activity: Financial gain remains the motivation behind many of the threats during the reporting period. For example, bot networks can be used not only to spread malicious code, but to send spam or phishing messages, download adware and spyware, attack an organization, and harvest confidential information. Symantec identified more than 4.6 million distinct, active bot network computers and observed an average of 57,717 active bot network computers per day during this period. Bot networks are also commonly used in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, a major threat to organizations as these attacks can result in disrupted communication, loss of revenue, damage to brand and reputation, and exposure to criminal extortion schemes. During the first half of 2006, Symantec observed an average of 6,110 DoS attacks per day.
Other financially motivated attacks use modular malicious code, malware that updates itself or downloads a more aggressive threat upon establishing a foothold on the victim host, to expose sensitive information. During the first half of 2006, modular malicious code accounted for 79% of the top 50 malicious code reported to Symantec. Additionally, malicious code threats that expose confidential data represented 30 of the top 50 samples submitted to Symantec.
Monday, November 20, 2006
Management of Natural Disasters In Developing Countries
Natural hazards are naturally occurring processes forming an experience to human being, depending on where one lives. Floods, volcanoes, tornadoes, bushfires, and hurricanes are the possible threats, which affect the environment and thus our lives. Encircling the total area of the Asian and Pacific region, which is 35 million square kilometer, around 60% of the world population resides in this area.
In this particular region, 50% of the world’s disaster was recorded during past 2 decades. On retrospection around 3 million lives have been claimed and the lives of around 1 million were grimly blown up during aforesaid period. To find out the outcome of problem, it requires exploring the reason of its origin and the possible antidotes so that it can dwindle to some extent.
Planning, managing and implementing environmentally sound strategies are the supreme measures in this concern. ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) has established a Bureau for Flood Control, which is functioning well since 1949. Development of active sub-regional network through the Typhoon committee in typhoon tracking and flood forecasting, panelized work on tropical cyclone, its cooperation with IDNDR (International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction) in Asia and activities of Mekong River Commission are important appreciable agendas to its credit.
The cooperation from such organizations has amplified the importance of viewing the present driving forces, which are responsible to intensify the severity of their occurrence. For example, increase in population density, rapid economic and social development, deforestation due to urbanization and other global factors contribute to disaster directly or indirectly.
Information exchange in the developing countries has not yet reached the levels of developing countries. In this scenario, it is of utmost importance to gather information at one place, so that needs and problems of other could also be interacted and disseminated to national and international research bodies as well as social organizations. In this way the developing countries can pool their limited resources to its best in cure procedures.
In this context the Centre for Science and Technology of the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (NAM S&T Centre) has brought out the present publication based on the proceedings of an international workshop organized by the Centre at the Asian Institute Technology (AIT), Bangkok, Thailand in January 2000. The material in this publication is arranged in a sequential manner beginning starting with several aspects of disaster management and continuing with the status reports from different countries with the lead paper giving the status of disaster management in India.
The volume contents mainly aim at identifying areas of mitigating flood, cyclone and storm surge disaster. The other status Reports are from well-known experts from different countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, and Vietnam are included in this volume.
(ResearchSEA)
In this particular region, 50% of the world’s disaster was recorded during past 2 decades. On retrospection around 3 million lives have been claimed and the lives of around 1 million were grimly blown up during aforesaid period. To find out the outcome of problem, it requires exploring the reason of its origin and the possible antidotes so that it can dwindle to some extent.
Planning, managing and implementing environmentally sound strategies are the supreme measures in this concern. ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) has established a Bureau for Flood Control, which is functioning well since 1949. Development of active sub-regional network through the Typhoon committee in typhoon tracking and flood forecasting, panelized work on tropical cyclone, its cooperation with IDNDR (International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction) in Asia and activities of Mekong River Commission are important appreciable agendas to its credit.
The cooperation from such organizations has amplified the importance of viewing the present driving forces, which are responsible to intensify the severity of their occurrence. For example, increase in population density, rapid economic and social development, deforestation due to urbanization and other global factors contribute to disaster directly or indirectly.
Information exchange in the developing countries has not yet reached the levels of developing countries. In this scenario, it is of utmost importance to gather information at one place, so that needs and problems of other could also be interacted and disseminated to national and international research bodies as well as social organizations. In this way the developing countries can pool their limited resources to its best in cure procedures.
In this context the Centre for Science and Technology of the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (NAM S&T Centre) has brought out the present publication based on the proceedings of an international workshop organized by the Centre at the Asian Institute Technology (AIT), Bangkok, Thailand in January 2000. The material in this publication is arranged in a sequential manner beginning starting with several aspects of disaster management and continuing with the status reports from different countries with the lead paper giving the status of disaster management in India.
The volume contents mainly aim at identifying areas of mitigating flood, cyclone and storm surge disaster. The other status Reports are from well-known experts from different countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, and Vietnam are included in this volume.
(ResearchSEA)
Iraq 'Mystery', Iran 'Puzzle', And Gates
By Nicole Stracke
In August 2004, Robert Gates was asked to make his predictions on Iraq's future. His answer: "We have the old line in the intelligence business that everything we want to know is divided into two categories: secrets and mysteries (and) Iraq is very much the latter."
Now, following his appointment as the new US Secretary of Defense, Gates is in the driving seat steering the administration towards an acceptable solution on Iraq 'mystery'.
At the same time, Gates has voiced his strong opinion about how to solve the Iran 'puzzle', saying that "the current lack of sustained engagement with Iran harms US interests in a critical region of the world...Direct dialogue with Tehran on specific areas of mutual concern should be pursued." The US should selectively engage Iran on issues where the interests of the two countries converge, "building upon incremental progress to tackle the broader range of concerns that divide the two governments."
So, the question is: how can Gates handle the two crises?
On Iraq, Gates has limited options and little room for maneuver. The new defense secretary may have arrived too late to the scene-- at a time when the situation seems to be beyond a solution.
A complete US troop withdrawal from the conflict-ridden country will be very costly for Iraq, as well as the region and the US. A troop withdrawal at this stage would be a defeat of the basic US objective in the region, as Iraq is likely to fall apart and end up under the control of extreme Sunni and Shiite groups, split in 3 entities-- a national Kurdish state in the north, an Ayatollah government in the south and Sunni fundamentalist state in the center of Iraq.
It is assumed that Gates was not appointed to bring about such a scenario. Considering his background and experience as an intelligence chief, he could tilt toward another recently circulated idea in the intelligence community. This scenario is based upon the idea of a military takeover by a group of trusted army officers in order to replace the current Iraqi government. This small circle of army officers belonging to the disbanded Iraqi army would represent the various sectarian affiliations of the complex Iraqi society. Similar to the scenario that the US adopted in Vietnam at one stage, this option is based on the assumption that these army officers would be able to impose effective control over the fractured country with the 'support' of the US Army. It is assumed that a new "strong leader" drawn from a new and strong central government could stabilize Iraq by declaring a state of emergency and suspending the democratic process. This is based on the idea that security is the prerequisite for democratization. The US might use this overall assumption as an argument to justify a military takeover to the American and world public.
Currently, the Iraqi society's demands are limited-- disappointed with the current government that is unable to guarantee security and lead the country away from the possibility of a civil war, it is assumed that the Iraqi society and the neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries would be tempted to welcome a "strong leader" who could enforce law and order.
There is a downside to this option-- the US would have to publicly abandon the process of democratization in Iraq and admit its weakness in controlling the country. The evident absence of US power could agitate all the sections of the Iraqi society and add fuel to fire. Secondly, once the new military leadership is in power, there is no guarantee that, in the long term, it will not abuse its position and develop into a tyrannical regime similar to Saddam Hussein's reign. It is also uncertain if the US will then have a say in the domestic developments in Iraq. In the long term, there is a chance that external actors will have diminishing influence and control over domestic politics in the region. Overall, a military takeover may stabilize Iraq in the short term, but spell uncertainty over the long term.
The third scenario that is in line with Gates' own views is centered around US engagement with Iran. In 2004, Gates stated that engagement with Iran was a possible alternative to confrontation since the unilateral policy adopted by the US to isolate Iran had not met with any success; it had neither prevented Iran from establishing its nuclear program nor contained Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. Iran is currently the only country that might be capable of influencing some extreme Shiite groups to end the violence. However, given the fact that the current violence not only includes extreme Shiites but also Sunnis, the Iranian capability to influence the stabilization of the overall situation in Iraq is certainly limited. Moreover, any closer US engagement with Iran will be viewed with caution by the GCC countries which are afraid of Iran emerging as a new "super-regional power".
Further, Gates' vision of engaging Iran on the Iraq issue was tested on 26 March 2006, when a team of American and Iranian officials met in Baghdad and tried to establish a dialogue to solve the Iraqi crisis. The conflict point that led to the final collapse of the dialogue was the diverse opinions and objectives. While the American officials were hoping to focus the dialogue on the Iranian interventionist policy in Iraq, Iran's objective centered around discussions covering all issues, including Iraq, the nuclear file, the US economic sanctions and other issues with the US that are outstanding since the 1979 Iranian revolution.
During the meeting, the two sides found that the gap between them was almost unbridgeable. That impression was emphasized with Iranian Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khameini saying that the only solution to the Iraqi crisis is complete American withdrawal, which asserted that further American presence in non-negotiable. Whether any new engagement with Iran and the revival of the March 2006 dialogue is possible depends now on whether or not both sides are capable of changing their attitudes, positions, demands, and objectives.
The current reality on the ground is that the Iranian nuclear file has been highly internationalized through the role of the UN Security Council. Resolution 1696 demands from Iran the suspension of uranium enrichment, making its nuclear program an issue that the international community has to deal with, and not just the EU or the US.
So far, the Iran's intervention in Iraq has remained outside the parameters of the UN Security Council. However, under Gates' leadership, the US could think of reviving the March 2006 dialogue offering the Iranians a clear-cut option, de-linking the Iranian nuclear issue from the Iraq situation. The US could sternly warn Iran to end any interventionist policy in Iraq and offer a bilateral agreement between itself and Iran over Iraq. The US could suggest that if Iran fails to act, Washington would internationalize the issue and seek a Security Council resolution to impose restrictions on Iran as punishment.
It is hard to predict Gates' course of action. He has been a member of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, a study group that went to Iraq to make new recommendations on the US government's policy in Iraq, and has first-hand knowledge about the ground realities. However, now that he is part of the decision-making process, how Gates will work on the Iraq mystery and solve the Iran puzzle remains a secret for now
(ResearchSEA)
In August 2004, Robert Gates was asked to make his predictions on Iraq's future. His answer: "We have the old line in the intelligence business that everything we want to know is divided into two categories: secrets and mysteries (and) Iraq is very much the latter."
Now, following his appointment as the new US Secretary of Defense, Gates is in the driving seat steering the administration towards an acceptable solution on Iraq 'mystery'.
At the same time, Gates has voiced his strong opinion about how to solve the Iran 'puzzle', saying that "the current lack of sustained engagement with Iran harms US interests in a critical region of the world...Direct dialogue with Tehran on specific areas of mutual concern should be pursued." The US should selectively engage Iran on issues where the interests of the two countries converge, "building upon incremental progress to tackle the broader range of concerns that divide the two governments."
So, the question is: how can Gates handle the two crises?
On Iraq, Gates has limited options and little room for maneuver. The new defense secretary may have arrived too late to the scene-- at a time when the situation seems to be beyond a solution.
A complete US troop withdrawal from the conflict-ridden country will be very costly for Iraq, as well as the region and the US. A troop withdrawal at this stage would be a defeat of the basic US objective in the region, as Iraq is likely to fall apart and end up under the control of extreme Sunni and Shiite groups, split in 3 entities-- a national Kurdish state in the north, an Ayatollah government in the south and Sunni fundamentalist state in the center of Iraq.
It is assumed that Gates was not appointed to bring about such a scenario. Considering his background and experience as an intelligence chief, he could tilt toward another recently circulated idea in the intelligence community. This scenario is based upon the idea of a military takeover by a group of trusted army officers in order to replace the current Iraqi government. This small circle of army officers belonging to the disbanded Iraqi army would represent the various sectarian affiliations of the complex Iraqi society. Similar to the scenario that the US adopted in Vietnam at one stage, this option is based on the assumption that these army officers would be able to impose effective control over the fractured country with the 'support' of the US Army. It is assumed that a new "strong leader" drawn from a new and strong central government could stabilize Iraq by declaring a state of emergency and suspending the democratic process. This is based on the idea that security is the prerequisite for democratization. The US might use this overall assumption as an argument to justify a military takeover to the American and world public.
Currently, the Iraqi society's demands are limited-- disappointed with the current government that is unable to guarantee security and lead the country away from the possibility of a civil war, it is assumed that the Iraqi society and the neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries would be tempted to welcome a "strong leader" who could enforce law and order.
There is a downside to this option-- the US would have to publicly abandon the process of democratization in Iraq and admit its weakness in controlling the country. The evident absence of US power could agitate all the sections of the Iraqi society and add fuel to fire. Secondly, once the new military leadership is in power, there is no guarantee that, in the long term, it will not abuse its position and develop into a tyrannical regime similar to Saddam Hussein's reign. It is also uncertain if the US will then have a say in the domestic developments in Iraq. In the long term, there is a chance that external actors will have diminishing influence and control over domestic politics in the region. Overall, a military takeover may stabilize Iraq in the short term, but spell uncertainty over the long term.
The third scenario that is in line with Gates' own views is centered around US engagement with Iran. In 2004, Gates stated that engagement with Iran was a possible alternative to confrontation since the unilateral policy adopted by the US to isolate Iran had not met with any success; it had neither prevented Iran from establishing its nuclear program nor contained Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. Iran is currently the only country that might be capable of influencing some extreme Shiite groups to end the violence. However, given the fact that the current violence not only includes extreme Shiites but also Sunnis, the Iranian capability to influence the stabilization of the overall situation in Iraq is certainly limited. Moreover, any closer US engagement with Iran will be viewed with caution by the GCC countries which are afraid of Iran emerging as a new "super-regional power".
Further, Gates' vision of engaging Iran on the Iraq issue was tested on 26 March 2006, when a team of American and Iranian officials met in Baghdad and tried to establish a dialogue to solve the Iraqi crisis. The conflict point that led to the final collapse of the dialogue was the diverse opinions and objectives. While the American officials were hoping to focus the dialogue on the Iranian interventionist policy in Iraq, Iran's objective centered around discussions covering all issues, including Iraq, the nuclear file, the US economic sanctions and other issues with the US that are outstanding since the 1979 Iranian revolution.
During the meeting, the two sides found that the gap between them was almost unbridgeable. That impression was emphasized with Iranian Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khameini saying that the only solution to the Iraqi crisis is complete American withdrawal, which asserted that further American presence in non-negotiable. Whether any new engagement with Iran and the revival of the March 2006 dialogue is possible depends now on whether or not both sides are capable of changing their attitudes, positions, demands, and objectives.
The current reality on the ground is that the Iranian nuclear file has been highly internationalized through the role of the UN Security Council. Resolution 1696 demands from Iran the suspension of uranium enrichment, making its nuclear program an issue that the international community has to deal with, and not just the EU or the US.
So far, the Iran's intervention in Iraq has remained outside the parameters of the UN Security Council. However, under Gates' leadership, the US could think of reviving the March 2006 dialogue offering the Iranians a clear-cut option, de-linking the Iranian nuclear issue from the Iraq situation. The US could sternly warn Iran to end any interventionist policy in Iraq and offer a bilateral agreement between itself and Iran over Iraq. The US could suggest that if Iran fails to act, Washington would internationalize the issue and seek a Security Council resolution to impose restrictions on Iran as punishment.
It is hard to predict Gates' course of action. He has been a member of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, a study group that went to Iraq to make new recommendations on the US government's policy in Iraq, and has first-hand knowledge about the ground realities. However, now that he is part of the decision-making process, how Gates will work on the Iraq mystery and solve the Iran puzzle remains a secret for now
(ResearchSEA)
Saturday, November 11, 2006
Changing Role Of Science Centers in Developing Countries
By Dr. Narender K. Sehgal
The social and economic development of a country is closely linked with the understanding and application of science and technology by its people. It is hence imperative that we comprehend and understand the impact of scientific and technological advances that have shaped our lives in the past few decades.
In this respect, science centers and museums play a vital role in communicating basic scientific information to the people and help them make informed choices. Further, science centers and museums act as an interface between the general public and the scientific community. Indeed, science centers and museums are powerful tools for social change and for developing a scientific outlook among the people.
Moreover, science centers and museums are very important in discovering and exploring ideas and also in helping to forge a strong relationship between science and society. Such assertive links are imperative because though science and technology can offer many benefits to the society and to the economy, these benefits can only be realized with the support of the public. The role of museums in society has also expanded as they are not merely concerned with the procurement, care, study and display of objects but also are the information centers for understanding our world, raising public awareness of current research and stimulating an interest in science among people. These can also help in encouraging more people from ethnic minorities into science.
This challenge is extremely important one if we are to realize the benefits of science. It will unable us to exchange ideas and forge new partnerships, and make a critical difference in this important dimension of our national lives. In order to fully comprehend the unprecedented growth in various fields of science and technology and their impact on the socio-economic progress particularly in an emerging economy, the role of science centers and museums is vital because of visual impression aids in the process of quickly grasping various facets of the new knowledge.
(ResearchSEA)
The social and economic development of a country is closely linked with the understanding and application of science and technology by its people. It is hence imperative that we comprehend and understand the impact of scientific and technological advances that have shaped our lives in the past few decades.
In this respect, science centers and museums play a vital role in communicating basic scientific information to the people and help them make informed choices. Further, science centers and museums act as an interface between the general public and the scientific community. Indeed, science centers and museums are powerful tools for social change and for developing a scientific outlook among the people.
Moreover, science centers and museums are very important in discovering and exploring ideas and also in helping to forge a strong relationship between science and society. Such assertive links are imperative because though science and technology can offer many benefits to the society and to the economy, these benefits can only be realized with the support of the public. The role of museums in society has also expanded as they are not merely concerned with the procurement, care, study and display of objects but also are the information centers for understanding our world, raising public awareness of current research and stimulating an interest in science among people. These can also help in encouraging more people from ethnic minorities into science.
This challenge is extremely important one if we are to realize the benefits of science. It will unable us to exchange ideas and forge new partnerships, and make a critical difference in this important dimension of our national lives. In order to fully comprehend the unprecedented growth in various fields of science and technology and their impact on the socio-economic progress particularly in an emerging economy, the role of science centers and museums is vital because of visual impression aids in the process of quickly grasping various facets of the new knowledge.
(ResearchSEA)
Thursday, November 09, 2006
Challenges Facing Science And Technology In Muslim Nations
Spending on research and development in Islamic world is well below the global average, and continues to fall behind that of developed countries in West. Countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and China are currently undergoing rapid expansion in science and technology, and economic growth- can a similar leap forward be made in Muslim world?
In a Commentary in this week's Nature, Nader Fergany, lead author of the Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR), argues that building a knowledge-based society in Arab world means respecting key freedoms of ex-pression and association. He discusses the AHDR reports, which identify deficits in the acquisition and production of knowledge, the levels of empowerment of women and individual and national freedom as major barriers to Arab development. Reports also lay out the necessary steps towards reform, the seeds of which Fergany believes are already in place. Given a more favorable environment, the considerable human potential of the Arab world could, he suggests, form a solid foundation to reclaim the epic scientific achievements of its history.
In a related Commentary, Herwig Schopper, former director-general of CERN and president of the SESAME Council, argues that a big jump in developing science and technology in Muslim nations is needed and makes several recommendations for how progress might be achieved.
He lists the many initiatives that have so far failed to lead to concrete action, and proposes that the importance of research in contributing to the overall welfare of Muslim societies needs to be recognized. There is also a real need to strengthen international scientific cooperation, and to work towards better job security for individual scientists. Schopper believes that science can be an "excellent tool" for building trust and helping to promote peace; there is, he says, much to gain.
Too few Muslim governments collect data on the actual status of science and innovation, so the problems facing scientists are not even on their agenda. Without true measures of quality and performance, weaknesses in higher education and research institutions will never be properly addressed. Declan Butler tackles the lack of statistics available on investment and performance, and analyses the best of what is available.
(ResearchSEA)
In a Commentary in this week's Nature, Nader Fergany, lead author of the Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR), argues that building a knowledge-based society in Arab world means respecting key freedoms of ex-pression and association. He discusses the AHDR reports, which identify deficits in the acquisition and production of knowledge, the levels of empowerment of women and individual and national freedom as major barriers to Arab development. Reports also lay out the necessary steps towards reform, the seeds of which Fergany believes are already in place. Given a more favorable environment, the considerable human potential of the Arab world could, he suggests, form a solid foundation to reclaim the epic scientific achievements of its history.
In a related Commentary, Herwig Schopper, former director-general of CERN and president of the SESAME Council, argues that a big jump in developing science and technology in Muslim nations is needed and makes several recommendations for how progress might be achieved.
He lists the many initiatives that have so far failed to lead to concrete action, and proposes that the importance of research in contributing to the overall welfare of Muslim societies needs to be recognized. There is also a real need to strengthen international scientific cooperation, and to work towards better job security for individual scientists. Schopper believes that science can be an "excellent tool" for building trust and helping to promote peace; there is, he says, much to gain.
Too few Muslim governments collect data on the actual status of science and innovation, so the problems facing scientists are not even on their agenda. Without true measures of quality and performance, weaknesses in higher education and research institutions will never be properly addressed. Declan Butler tackles the lack of statistics available on investment and performance, and analyses the best of what is available.
(ResearchSEA)
Monday, November 06, 2006
Curcumin: Some FAQs
By Uma Aggarwal
There are tremendous health benefits of Curcumin, active ingredient of Turmeric. Just taking of 500mg a day can solve lot of common problems, like allergies, aches and pain, high blood pressure, cholesterol, acne, skin problems, arthritis, acid reflex, sinus infections etc. It is the good old benefits of Turmeric except in concentrated form. If taken in high doses it has also cured cancer. These are some Frequently Asked Questions regarding Curcumin---
What is Curcumin?
Curcumin is a component of an Indian spice, turmeric. It is estimated that 100 grams of turmeric contains 3-5 gram curcumin. Curcumin gives a yellow color to turmeric, also present in curry powder. Chemically, Curcumin is called Diferuloylmethane. Curcumin is yellow-orange in color. It is used as a natural yellow coloring in mustard, cereals, cheese, and butter. In some countries, it is used as a natural coloring agent in the textile industry.
When was Curcumin isolated?
Curcumin was isolated from the spice turmeric, as one of the active principle, more than 100 years ago.
What does Curcumin do?
The activity of Curcumin has been demonstrated against cancer, cardiovascular diseases, type II diabetes, Crohn’s disease, psoriasis, atopic dermatitis, arthritis etc.
How does Curcumin work?
Turmeric has been described in Ayurveda as an agent that can suppress inflammation. An extensive research during last 50 years has revealed that the anti-inflammatory activity of turmeric is due to Curcumin. Curcumin can inhibit both the activity and the synthesis of cyclooxygenase-2 and 5-lipooxygenase; and other enzymes that have been implicated in inflammation. Curcumin has also been shown to work through numerous other mechanisms. More than 700 genes have been shown to be modulated by Curcumin.
Does Curcumin work against cancer?
Curcumin has been shown to prevent a large of number of cancers in animal studies. Laboratory data indicates that curcumin can inhibits tumor initiation, promotion, invasion, angiogenesis and metastasis. Epidemeological evidence indicate that incidence of certain cancers are less in people who consume Curcumin than those who do not. Recent evidence indicates that, besides chemo-preventive activity, Curcumin may also be effective in the treatment of cancer.
How does Curcumin work against cancer?
Numerous mechanisms have been described for the anticancer activity of Curcumin. Inhibition of proliferation of tumor cells, induction of apoptosis (a mode of cell death), inhibition of transformation of cells from normal to tumor, invasion of invasion and metastasis and suppression of inflammation, have been linked with the anticancer activity of Curcumin. Downregulation of COX2, 5-LOX, adhesion molecules, inflammatory cytokines, chemokines, growth factor receptors, VEGF and transcription factors by Curcumin have been linked to its anti-tumor activity.
Does Curcumin work against arthritis?
Arthritis is also a pro-inflammatory disease. All current drugs approved for arthritis have anti-inflammatory activity. Anti-TNF therapy has been approved for this disease. Curcumin has been shown to both suppress the TNF production as well as block the action of TNF. Curcumin, when applied topically, has been shown to have activity against arthritis.
Does Curcumin work against Crohn’s disease (inflammatory bowl disease)?
Crohn’s disease is also a pro-inflammatory disease. All current drugs approved for this disease have anti-inflammatory activity. Anti-TNF therapy has been approved for this disease. Curcumin has been shown to both suppress the TNF production and the TNF action. Curcumin, taken orally, has been shown to have activity against Crohn’s disease.
Does Curcumin accelerate wound-healing?
There is numerous experimental data that suggest that Curcumin can accelerate wound healing. This has lead Johnson & Johnson to supply Curcumin-containing band-aid.
Does Curcumin work against Psoriasis?
Psoriasis is another pro-inflammatory disease. Numerous evidence, both in animal and human, indicate that Curcumin is quite effective against Psoriasis when applied topically to the skin.
Does Curcumin work against Alzheimer disease?
Because Alzheimer disease is caused in part by amyloid-induced inflammation, Curcumin has been shown to be effective against Alzheimer. Clinical trials are in progress in UCLA with Curcumin for Alzheimer.
Are there any human clinical trials done with Curcumin?
There have been at least 10 different clinical trials performed with Curcumin in patients with different diseases. These are mostly pilot studies that are “proof of concept” type. More than 10 trials are now in progress in United States and other countries.
Has there been any toxicity associated with Curcumin?
According to one of the Phase I study, Curcumin was found to be safe in human subjects even when consumed up to 8 grams per day for three months. Inspite of it, one is recommended to take low dose 500 mg/day to higher dose if needed gradually. Look for signs of both potential toxicity and improvement by talking to your body and to your doctor.
Recommendations for Cancer: If you have cancer, please consider Curcumin for yourself as following regimen--
1 g/day for week one; if no side effects then,
2 g/day for week two; if no side effects then (can be split into 3 separate doses).,
4 g/day for week three; if no side effects then (can be split into 3 separate doses).,
8 g/day for week four; for eight weeks (can be split into 3 separate doses).
By then, a significant improvement is expected.
How should I take Curcumin?
There are reports to indicate Curcumin taken empty stomach is more effective than with the meals. Thus it is recommended that you take Curcumin 1hour before meals. If you are taking Curcumin powder, you can take it with milk, yogurt, coconut milk or other fluids.
Where do I buy Curcumin?
Although there are numerous companies that supply Curcumin, one need to be careful that you are buying genuine product.
(umaagg@yahoo.com)
There are tremendous health benefits of Curcumin, active ingredient of Turmeric. Just taking of 500mg a day can solve lot of common problems, like allergies, aches and pain, high blood pressure, cholesterol, acne, skin problems, arthritis, acid reflex, sinus infections etc. It is the good old benefits of Turmeric except in concentrated form. If taken in high doses it has also cured cancer. These are some Frequently Asked Questions regarding Curcumin---
What is Curcumin?
Curcumin is a component of an Indian spice, turmeric. It is estimated that 100 grams of turmeric contains 3-5 gram curcumin. Curcumin gives a yellow color to turmeric, also present in curry powder. Chemically, Curcumin is called Diferuloylmethane. Curcumin is yellow-orange in color. It is used as a natural yellow coloring in mustard, cereals, cheese, and butter. In some countries, it is used as a natural coloring agent in the textile industry.
When was Curcumin isolated?
Curcumin was isolated from the spice turmeric, as one of the active principle, more than 100 years ago.
What does Curcumin do?
The activity of Curcumin has been demonstrated against cancer, cardiovascular diseases, type II diabetes, Crohn’s disease, psoriasis, atopic dermatitis, arthritis etc.
How does Curcumin work?
Turmeric has been described in Ayurveda as an agent that can suppress inflammation. An extensive research during last 50 years has revealed that the anti-inflammatory activity of turmeric is due to Curcumin. Curcumin can inhibit both the activity and the synthesis of cyclooxygenase-2 and 5-lipooxygenase; and other enzymes that have been implicated in inflammation. Curcumin has also been shown to work through numerous other mechanisms. More than 700 genes have been shown to be modulated by Curcumin.
Does Curcumin work against cancer?
Curcumin has been shown to prevent a large of number of cancers in animal studies. Laboratory data indicates that curcumin can inhibits tumor initiation, promotion, invasion, angiogenesis and metastasis. Epidemeological evidence indicate that incidence of certain cancers are less in people who consume Curcumin than those who do not. Recent evidence indicates that, besides chemo-preventive activity, Curcumin may also be effective in the treatment of cancer.
How does Curcumin work against cancer?
Numerous mechanisms have been described for the anticancer activity of Curcumin. Inhibition of proliferation of tumor cells, induction of apoptosis (a mode of cell death), inhibition of transformation of cells from normal to tumor, invasion of invasion and metastasis and suppression of inflammation, have been linked with the anticancer activity of Curcumin. Downregulation of COX2, 5-LOX, adhesion molecules, inflammatory cytokines, chemokines, growth factor receptors, VEGF and transcription factors by Curcumin have been linked to its anti-tumor activity.
Does Curcumin work against arthritis?
Arthritis is also a pro-inflammatory disease. All current drugs approved for arthritis have anti-inflammatory activity. Anti-TNF therapy has been approved for this disease. Curcumin has been shown to both suppress the TNF production as well as block the action of TNF. Curcumin, when applied topically, has been shown to have activity against arthritis.
Does Curcumin work against Crohn’s disease (inflammatory bowl disease)?
Crohn’s disease is also a pro-inflammatory disease. All current drugs approved for this disease have anti-inflammatory activity. Anti-TNF therapy has been approved for this disease. Curcumin has been shown to both suppress the TNF production and the TNF action. Curcumin, taken orally, has been shown to have activity against Crohn’s disease.
Does Curcumin accelerate wound-healing?
There is numerous experimental data that suggest that Curcumin can accelerate wound healing. This has lead Johnson & Johnson to supply Curcumin-containing band-aid.
Does Curcumin work against Psoriasis?
Psoriasis is another pro-inflammatory disease. Numerous evidence, both in animal and human, indicate that Curcumin is quite effective against Psoriasis when applied topically to the skin.
Does Curcumin work against Alzheimer disease?
Because Alzheimer disease is caused in part by amyloid-induced inflammation, Curcumin has been shown to be effective against Alzheimer. Clinical trials are in progress in UCLA with Curcumin for Alzheimer.
Are there any human clinical trials done with Curcumin?
There have been at least 10 different clinical trials performed with Curcumin in patients with different diseases. These are mostly pilot studies that are “proof of concept” type. More than 10 trials are now in progress in United States and other countries.
Has there been any toxicity associated with Curcumin?
According to one of the Phase I study, Curcumin was found to be safe in human subjects even when consumed up to 8 grams per day for three months. Inspite of it, one is recommended to take low dose 500 mg/day to higher dose if needed gradually. Look for signs of both potential toxicity and improvement by talking to your body and to your doctor.
Recommendations for Cancer: If you have cancer, please consider Curcumin for yourself as following regimen--
1 g/day for week one; if no side effects then,
2 g/day for week two; if no side effects then (can be split into 3 separate doses).,
4 g/day for week three; if no side effects then (can be split into 3 separate doses).,
8 g/day for week four; for eight weeks (can be split into 3 separate doses).
By then, a significant improvement is expected.
How should I take Curcumin?
There are reports to indicate Curcumin taken empty stomach is more effective than with the meals. Thus it is recommended that you take Curcumin 1hour before meals. If you are taking Curcumin powder, you can take it with milk, yogurt, coconut milk or other fluids.
Where do I buy Curcumin?
Although there are numerous companies that supply Curcumin, one need to be careful that you are buying genuine product.
(umaagg@yahoo.com)
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
'Plan B' For Iraq Raises More Questions Than Answers
By Dr. N. Janardhan
Despite Washington's most recent reiteration that there will be no dramatic shifts in the US policy toward Iraq, not many except US President George W. Bush's coterie know what exactly awaits the war-torn country. But many of the 'Plan B' or "course correction" recommendations doing the rumor rounds in the United States pose more questions than provide answers.
According to some of the scenarios that have emerged from the 'Plan B' leaks, Iraq could either be partitioned into three ethnic regions or the United States could withdraw troops in a phased manner "with some remaining in neighboring countries to deal with major threats" or the US-trained Iraqi army could stage a coup against the elected government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and replace him with a "strongman", with Washington's tacit approval.
Preparations for the 'cut and run' strategy is already emerging with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's spin-- "The biggest mistake would be not to pass things over to the Iraqis. It's their country. They're going to have to govern it. They're going to have to provide security for it. And they're going to have to do it sooner rather than later."
Top American commander in Iraq, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., alluded to the plan by suggesting that Iraqi forces would be ready to take over security responsibility from the Americans in late 2007 or early 2008.
An option that even the Democrats are willing to consider is the one outlined by former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski- a joint declaration by the US and Iraqi governments on a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops, followed by an international conference on stabilizing Iraq and a proactive economic reconstruction.
While Washington attempts to spin all its interventionist policies as being in the welfare of the conflict zone in question, it is, in fact, very much motivated by domestic and political factors. The invasion of Iraq was aimed at consolidating the Republican stronghold ahead of the 2004 presidential elections by propagating the post-9/11 fear psychosis among Americans. Likewise, the ongoing debate about the change of American tack in Iraq is conditioned by the high rate of American troop casualties and the resultant declining stock of the Republicans ahead of the congressional elections in November and the build-up to the 2008 presidential elections. It could well be that Plan B is a mere dummy ploy to fool the American voters into believing that the Bush administration is open to admitting mistakes and taking corrective measures. Depending on the outcome of next month's elections, Plan B will be either selectively operationalized or completely dumped.
While Washington failed in its counter-terror strategies in Iraq, it has succeeded in keeping its own territory free from terror attacks during the last five years. The Republicans have successfully portrayed themselves as the best defenders against terror at home. The 2004 presidential elections exemplified this approach and the results confirmed its success. It appears that the same tactics are being replayed ahead of next month's elections and, depending on its results, quite possibly in 2008 too.
Currently, the security situation in Iraq is so grave that at least 100 Iraqis are being killed every day in worsening sectarian violence and the US could end up losing more than 100 soldiers just in October (96 were killed in 26 days), the highest one-month toll for the Americans since the war began in 2003.
Linking the likely change in Iraq strategy to US politics is the fact that the official recommendations by the Iraq Study Group, headed by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, will be made public only after November 7.
While analyzing the alternative scenarios, there is little doubt that the division of Iraq is a perfect recipe for disaster, one that was repeatedly highlighted by several countries in the Middle East to discourage the US from invading Iraq. At a time when the region is already worried about the repercussions of a defiant Iran and stronger Hezbollah in Lebanon, another exclusively Shiite entity in Iraq is seen as ominous by Iraq's Sunni neighbors in the Gulf. The Kurdish question will open a separate front of problems for Iraq's other neighbors. Further, if Iran is indeed the culprit behind the instability in Iraq, the plan to facilitate disintegration of Iraq along ethnic lines is also most beneficial to Iran. What happens then to the argument of rendering Iran's mullahs weak by having a democratic Iraq?
The partition plan acquired an air of reality when a law allowing regions to form federal entities from existing provinces was passed by the Iraqi parliament on October 11. Though 18 months remain before the law becomes effective, Kurds rejoiced as Sunni MPs and the Muqtada Al-Sadr bloc of the powerful Shiite alliance boycotted the vote in protest.
The irony is that withdrawal of troops was a consistent request from many Arab quarters since the ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime. Apart from deliberate external attempts to fuel instability, conduct a proxy war against the US and gain political leverage in a power vacuum, it is certainly relevant to also classify insurgency in Iraq as a form of resistance against foreign occupation. Had parts of this option -- perhaps a phased withdrawal or at least a timetable- been considered earlier, it may have served the interests of all concerned- Iraq, its neighbors and the US.
At a time when more troops are needed to quell the violence, the possibility of the situation in Iraq improving as a result of the US withdrawing its troops and leaving it to Iraqis to settle matters is just as unlikely as terror suffering a severe setback by killing or capturing Osama bin Laden or his deputies.
Nothing is more hypocritical than the military coup option. Even a remote consideration of this option violates the spirit of the US's Freedom Agenda launched in 2003 to propagate democratic transformation in the Middle East. While Iraq was touted as the ideal starting ground, further consideration of the coup option would imply thumbs down to ballots and perpetration of a rule by bullets. This would also expose the US's pre-war justification to overthrow the Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in favor of democracy.
3 years after the US stood firm in its conviction that it was possible to invade Iraq, oust the Baath Party and implant democracy without anticipating a crisis of the kind that currently prevails, there is little doubt that it stands defeated. It took Washington three years to admit that Iraq is a possible parallel to the 1968 Tet offensive that prompted loss of support for the Vietnam War among Americans. Though Alberto Fernandez, director of public diplomacy in the State Department's bureau of Near Eastern affairs, withdrew his statement in 24 hours, it took someone in the administration three years to admit that the US had shown "arrogance" and "stupidity" in Iraq. And, it took three years for the US to seriously consider alternate plans when their main plank fell apart. Thus, in planning an alternate approach now, can the US be sure that it has a workable plan or will it wait for another three years to decide if there is yet another way out of the likely mess?
(ResearchSEA)
Despite Washington's most recent reiteration that there will be no dramatic shifts in the US policy toward Iraq, not many except US President George W. Bush's coterie know what exactly awaits the war-torn country. But many of the 'Plan B' or "course correction" recommendations doing the rumor rounds in the United States pose more questions than provide answers.
According to some of the scenarios that have emerged from the 'Plan B' leaks, Iraq could either be partitioned into three ethnic regions or the United States could withdraw troops in a phased manner "with some remaining in neighboring countries to deal with major threats" or the US-trained Iraqi army could stage a coup against the elected government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and replace him with a "strongman", with Washington's tacit approval.
Preparations for the 'cut and run' strategy is already emerging with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's spin-- "The biggest mistake would be not to pass things over to the Iraqis. It's their country. They're going to have to govern it. They're going to have to provide security for it. And they're going to have to do it sooner rather than later."
Top American commander in Iraq, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., alluded to the plan by suggesting that Iraqi forces would be ready to take over security responsibility from the Americans in late 2007 or early 2008.
An option that even the Democrats are willing to consider is the one outlined by former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski- a joint declaration by the US and Iraqi governments on a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops, followed by an international conference on stabilizing Iraq and a proactive economic reconstruction.
While Washington attempts to spin all its interventionist policies as being in the welfare of the conflict zone in question, it is, in fact, very much motivated by domestic and political factors. The invasion of Iraq was aimed at consolidating the Republican stronghold ahead of the 2004 presidential elections by propagating the post-9/11 fear psychosis among Americans. Likewise, the ongoing debate about the change of American tack in Iraq is conditioned by the high rate of American troop casualties and the resultant declining stock of the Republicans ahead of the congressional elections in November and the build-up to the 2008 presidential elections. It could well be that Plan B is a mere dummy ploy to fool the American voters into believing that the Bush administration is open to admitting mistakes and taking corrective measures. Depending on the outcome of next month's elections, Plan B will be either selectively operationalized or completely dumped.
While Washington failed in its counter-terror strategies in Iraq, it has succeeded in keeping its own territory free from terror attacks during the last five years. The Republicans have successfully portrayed themselves as the best defenders against terror at home. The 2004 presidential elections exemplified this approach and the results confirmed its success. It appears that the same tactics are being replayed ahead of next month's elections and, depending on its results, quite possibly in 2008 too.
Currently, the security situation in Iraq is so grave that at least 100 Iraqis are being killed every day in worsening sectarian violence and the US could end up losing more than 100 soldiers just in October (96 were killed in 26 days), the highest one-month toll for the Americans since the war began in 2003.
Linking the likely change in Iraq strategy to US politics is the fact that the official recommendations by the Iraq Study Group, headed by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, will be made public only after November 7.
While analyzing the alternative scenarios, there is little doubt that the division of Iraq is a perfect recipe for disaster, one that was repeatedly highlighted by several countries in the Middle East to discourage the US from invading Iraq. At a time when the region is already worried about the repercussions of a defiant Iran and stronger Hezbollah in Lebanon, another exclusively Shiite entity in Iraq is seen as ominous by Iraq's Sunni neighbors in the Gulf. The Kurdish question will open a separate front of problems for Iraq's other neighbors. Further, if Iran is indeed the culprit behind the instability in Iraq, the plan to facilitate disintegration of Iraq along ethnic lines is also most beneficial to Iran. What happens then to the argument of rendering Iran's mullahs weak by having a democratic Iraq?
The partition plan acquired an air of reality when a law allowing regions to form federal entities from existing provinces was passed by the Iraqi parliament on October 11. Though 18 months remain before the law becomes effective, Kurds rejoiced as Sunni MPs and the Muqtada Al-Sadr bloc of the powerful Shiite alliance boycotted the vote in protest.
The irony is that withdrawal of troops was a consistent request from many Arab quarters since the ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime. Apart from deliberate external attempts to fuel instability, conduct a proxy war against the US and gain political leverage in a power vacuum, it is certainly relevant to also classify insurgency in Iraq as a form of resistance against foreign occupation. Had parts of this option -- perhaps a phased withdrawal or at least a timetable- been considered earlier, it may have served the interests of all concerned- Iraq, its neighbors and the US.
At a time when more troops are needed to quell the violence, the possibility of the situation in Iraq improving as a result of the US withdrawing its troops and leaving it to Iraqis to settle matters is just as unlikely as terror suffering a severe setback by killing or capturing Osama bin Laden or his deputies.
Nothing is more hypocritical than the military coup option. Even a remote consideration of this option violates the spirit of the US's Freedom Agenda launched in 2003 to propagate democratic transformation in the Middle East. While Iraq was touted as the ideal starting ground, further consideration of the coup option would imply thumbs down to ballots and perpetration of a rule by bullets. This would also expose the US's pre-war justification to overthrow the Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in favor of democracy.
3 years after the US stood firm in its conviction that it was possible to invade Iraq, oust the Baath Party and implant democracy without anticipating a crisis of the kind that currently prevails, there is little doubt that it stands defeated. It took Washington three years to admit that Iraq is a possible parallel to the 1968 Tet offensive that prompted loss of support for the Vietnam War among Americans. Though Alberto Fernandez, director of public diplomacy in the State Department's bureau of Near Eastern affairs, withdrew his statement in 24 hours, it took someone in the administration three years to admit that the US had shown "arrogance" and "stupidity" in Iraq. And, it took three years for the US to seriously consider alternate plans when their main plank fell apart. Thus, in planning an alternate approach now, can the US be sure that it has a workable plan or will it wait for another three years to decide if there is yet another way out of the likely mess?
(ResearchSEA)
Converging Interests: Iraq War As Catalyst For Change
It is not due to genius design nor is it due to reckless planning that Iraq succeeds or fails in rebuilding. Although the initial decision to go to war can be judged as right or wrong, the outcome of a war is difficult to predetermine. It is certain however that war produces an environment that is radically and fundamentally different from the one that was before the war. The difference manifests itself concretely and abstractly.
War, being the violent event that it generally is, can cause a country to break down into smaller communities. Many wars of the modern times have produced such an outcome. The European wars produced East and West Germany. American interventions in Asia produced North and South Korea. Western colonialism created North and South Yemen. More recently, the Balkan war fragmented the former Yugoslavia into tiny states demarcated by ethnic, religious, and cultural differences. The so-called World Wars (Western and European initiated wars) divided the globe between the emerging superpowers (the Soviet Union and the United States) and launched the Cold War that strangled developing nations for nearly three quarters of a century.
The same way military interventions can cause countries to breakdown, foreign occupation is also capable of solidifying national unity and creating stronger solidarities within the occupied countries. The American Revolutionary and Civil wars established the US as a Superpower. The Western colonial endeavors in Africa created strong nationalistic political movements in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Iraq; countries whose populations are mosaics of disparate ethnic, religious, and linguistic origins. In Algeria, Berbers and Arabs united to create the Algerian Popular Republic with a strong sense of nationalism that transcended ethnicity and religion. In Egypt, Syria and Iraq; the Arabs, Copts, Christians, Kurds, Assyrians, Sunnis, and Shi`ites united under the banner of Arab nationalism to liberate their lands from the French and British occupation. Military control over what used to be known as Eastern Pakistan frustrated the natives and galvanized the population to free themselves and establish their Bangladeshi homeland and identity.
Although it is difficult to predict exactly the outcome of violent interventions, it is fairly easy to assume that once a violent intervention is identified as a colonial or occupying force; such an entity will be eventually defeated and expelled. Should an occupying force persist, it becomes very likely that occupied territories are broken into two or more regions. One region would represent the rejecters of occupation; the other would serve as an occupier-friendly entity.
Iraq, as part of the Muslim world, is faced with a complex set of circumstances. On the one hand, the justification for the US and British invasion of the country was discredited and that enflamed domestic and world public opposition to the war. Although the invading countries tried to re-justify their military intervention as an act of liberation, their presence is still seen by a large segment of the Iraqi population as occupation. The political maneuvering and the results of numerous elections in Iraq produced a second set of circumstances.
December 2005 election was portrayed as the process that would transfer sovereignty back to the Iraqis. Although the political sovereignty may have been indeed regained, the weakness of the emerging government, the sectarian strife, and the failure of executive branch to establish law and order over the entire country made it impossible for the US and the UK to withdraw. As a result, these countries are still seen as occupiers and the new Iraqi regime is transformed into an accomplice to occupation. Should this situation continue for a year or two, Iraq will undoubtedly split into three countries. The Kurds will solidify their autonomy in the Northeastern portion of the country, the Shi`ites will establish a similar autonomous region in the south, and the rest of the country (the western and central portion) will fall in the hands of Sunni Arabs. This scenario is likely but it is not the only one. Another scenario hinges on Muslims’ willingness to and success in undertaking religious, legal, and political reform. Sunni and Shi`ite divide is the driving force behind the Iraqi discord and only by addressing these issues can the unity of Iraq be preserved. Additionally, political and military events outside Iraq seem to contribute to the volatility of the Sunni-Shi`ite relations.
One of these events that happed outside Iraq is the 34-day war between Hezbollah and Israel. As a Shi`ite movement, Hezbollah’s success in dealing with Israel has focused Muslims’ attention on its place as an “Islamic” group. Some Saudi scholars issued fatwas prohibiting public support for Hezbollah since they see it as “deviant” sect. Other Sunni scholars, including the influential Yousef al-Qaradawi, decreed that supporting Hezbollah is a “religious obligation” (wâjib). This divergence of opinions is indicative of an emerging intellectual and political discussions of the differences between and the legacies of the Shi`ites and the Sunnis.
Meanwhile, the warm relationship between Hezbollah and Hamas, the latter being a Sunni group, and the probable role of Hezbollah in freeing Arab and Sunni prisoners would have a considerable impact on the Sunni-Shi`ite divide in Iraq. It is likely that Seyed Hussein Nasrullah will be asked to intervene. Should he do so successfully, the civil war in Iraq will become less likely, and more importantly, a serious discussion of the place and role of Shi`ite Islam will be underway.
For too long, many Sunni scholars treated Shi`ites as second class citizens. Some conservative Sunni scholars from Saudi Arabia have considered them deviant individuals. The debate about the status of the Shi`ites that may take place because of the sectarian tension in Iraq could rectify that position. Similarly, some Shi`ites consider Sunnis accomplices in the historical atrocities and murder of ahl al-bayt and the ongoing cover-ups. It is likely that this debate would lead to a substantive examination of the status and future of civil society and citizenship in Muslim countries. So far, the Arab nationalistic model has oppressed the religious conservatives and the religious conservatives have oppressed nationalists. In other words, it seems that all Muslim regimes see the rights of a citizen in a Muslim country as contingent on one’s identification with the dominant political platform of the ruling regime. For example, the rights of Iranian Sunni citizens are not equal to that of an Iranian Shi`ite citizen according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Similarly, Shi`ite citizens in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and many other Arab and Muslim countries are marginalized and oppressed. In general, the Muslim world is yet to recognize fundamental rights of citizens irrespective of one’s religious, ethnic, and linguistic identity.
The aftermath of the invasion of Iraq should underscore the need for establishing civil society and for guaranteeing the rights of citizens without qualifications. For Iraq to retain its territorial and political integrity, the Sunnis and the Shi`ites of the Muslim world must resolve centuries old grievances and differences. When that happens, they would have achieved the first condition of peaceful coexistence. The breakup of Iraq will, however, signals the chronic nature of the problem and the incompetence of Muslim scholars and leaders. Should this be the end result, the military invasion of Iraq would be added to the West’s list of miscalculations and deadly interventions in the Muslim world. If the Iraqis and Muslims survive these challenges, their accomplishment will undoubtedly signal a new political and intellectual maturity worthy of its demographic, historical, and civilizational heritage.
There are emerging indications that many Muslim leaders are aware of this historical time and the responsibilities that come with it. Recently, the influential International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS) has called for an international gathering of “religious authorities of different Muslim sects to probe means of closing the Muslim ranks and uprooting sectarianism.” Soon after the announcement, the Iranian religious supreme leader threw his weight behind the proposal. The IUMS was pleased and released a statement that said in part: “”Khamenei extolled the call by the Dublin-based IUMS and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to organize a conference bringing together religious authorities of the different Muslim sects with the aim of clarifying the religious stance on such practices and ending such malicious crimes.”
These developments offer Muslims and the West (especially the USA) a way out. The US needs to avert a total civil war in Iraq. Muslims want to pacify a region that is sliding towards extremism. These converging interests may be the only formula that will bring about stability to Iraq, offer a way out for the US from an ill-conceived and ill-executed unnecessary war, and initiate fundamental political transformation in the wider Muslim world. For that to happen, the US administration must drop its simplistic approach of looking at the world through a lens that reflects only black and white characterization of the reality. It must start meaningful and serious conversations with all parties involved. Dealing only with the so-called “moderate” regimes is seen by Muslim masses as a continued support for tyranny, corruption, and authoritarianism. It is more productive to respect the will of the people even if that may seem to bring about unfriendly regimes to power than to support non-representative figures. It is natural that people whose choices were respected will be more respectful of the choices of others. The West needs to adopt long-term policies and diplomacy that transcend friendly (moderate) personalities who are undoubtedly outlasted, one way or another, by the people.
(ResearchSEA)
War, being the violent event that it generally is, can cause a country to break down into smaller communities. Many wars of the modern times have produced such an outcome. The European wars produced East and West Germany. American interventions in Asia produced North and South Korea. Western colonialism created North and South Yemen. More recently, the Balkan war fragmented the former Yugoslavia into tiny states demarcated by ethnic, religious, and cultural differences. The so-called World Wars (Western and European initiated wars) divided the globe between the emerging superpowers (the Soviet Union and the United States) and launched the Cold War that strangled developing nations for nearly three quarters of a century.
The same way military interventions can cause countries to breakdown, foreign occupation is also capable of solidifying national unity and creating stronger solidarities within the occupied countries. The American Revolutionary and Civil wars established the US as a Superpower. The Western colonial endeavors in Africa created strong nationalistic political movements in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Iraq; countries whose populations are mosaics of disparate ethnic, religious, and linguistic origins. In Algeria, Berbers and Arabs united to create the Algerian Popular Republic with a strong sense of nationalism that transcended ethnicity and religion. In Egypt, Syria and Iraq; the Arabs, Copts, Christians, Kurds, Assyrians, Sunnis, and Shi`ites united under the banner of Arab nationalism to liberate their lands from the French and British occupation. Military control over what used to be known as Eastern Pakistan frustrated the natives and galvanized the population to free themselves and establish their Bangladeshi homeland and identity.
Although it is difficult to predict exactly the outcome of violent interventions, it is fairly easy to assume that once a violent intervention is identified as a colonial or occupying force; such an entity will be eventually defeated and expelled. Should an occupying force persist, it becomes very likely that occupied territories are broken into two or more regions. One region would represent the rejecters of occupation; the other would serve as an occupier-friendly entity.
Iraq, as part of the Muslim world, is faced with a complex set of circumstances. On the one hand, the justification for the US and British invasion of the country was discredited and that enflamed domestic and world public opposition to the war. Although the invading countries tried to re-justify their military intervention as an act of liberation, their presence is still seen by a large segment of the Iraqi population as occupation. The political maneuvering and the results of numerous elections in Iraq produced a second set of circumstances.
December 2005 election was portrayed as the process that would transfer sovereignty back to the Iraqis. Although the political sovereignty may have been indeed regained, the weakness of the emerging government, the sectarian strife, and the failure of executive branch to establish law and order over the entire country made it impossible for the US and the UK to withdraw. As a result, these countries are still seen as occupiers and the new Iraqi regime is transformed into an accomplice to occupation. Should this situation continue for a year or two, Iraq will undoubtedly split into three countries. The Kurds will solidify their autonomy in the Northeastern portion of the country, the Shi`ites will establish a similar autonomous region in the south, and the rest of the country (the western and central portion) will fall in the hands of Sunni Arabs. This scenario is likely but it is not the only one. Another scenario hinges on Muslims’ willingness to and success in undertaking religious, legal, and political reform. Sunni and Shi`ite divide is the driving force behind the Iraqi discord and only by addressing these issues can the unity of Iraq be preserved. Additionally, political and military events outside Iraq seem to contribute to the volatility of the Sunni-Shi`ite relations.
One of these events that happed outside Iraq is the 34-day war between Hezbollah and Israel. As a Shi`ite movement, Hezbollah’s success in dealing with Israel has focused Muslims’ attention on its place as an “Islamic” group. Some Saudi scholars issued fatwas prohibiting public support for Hezbollah since they see it as “deviant” sect. Other Sunni scholars, including the influential Yousef al-Qaradawi, decreed that supporting Hezbollah is a “religious obligation” (wâjib). This divergence of opinions is indicative of an emerging intellectual and political discussions of the differences between and the legacies of the Shi`ites and the Sunnis.
Meanwhile, the warm relationship between Hezbollah and Hamas, the latter being a Sunni group, and the probable role of Hezbollah in freeing Arab and Sunni prisoners would have a considerable impact on the Sunni-Shi`ite divide in Iraq. It is likely that Seyed Hussein Nasrullah will be asked to intervene. Should he do so successfully, the civil war in Iraq will become less likely, and more importantly, a serious discussion of the place and role of Shi`ite Islam will be underway.
For too long, many Sunni scholars treated Shi`ites as second class citizens. Some conservative Sunni scholars from Saudi Arabia have considered them deviant individuals. The debate about the status of the Shi`ites that may take place because of the sectarian tension in Iraq could rectify that position. Similarly, some Shi`ites consider Sunnis accomplices in the historical atrocities and murder of ahl al-bayt and the ongoing cover-ups. It is likely that this debate would lead to a substantive examination of the status and future of civil society and citizenship in Muslim countries. So far, the Arab nationalistic model has oppressed the religious conservatives and the religious conservatives have oppressed nationalists. In other words, it seems that all Muslim regimes see the rights of a citizen in a Muslim country as contingent on one’s identification with the dominant political platform of the ruling regime. For example, the rights of Iranian Sunni citizens are not equal to that of an Iranian Shi`ite citizen according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Similarly, Shi`ite citizens in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and many other Arab and Muslim countries are marginalized and oppressed. In general, the Muslim world is yet to recognize fundamental rights of citizens irrespective of one’s religious, ethnic, and linguistic identity.
The aftermath of the invasion of Iraq should underscore the need for establishing civil society and for guaranteeing the rights of citizens without qualifications. For Iraq to retain its territorial and political integrity, the Sunnis and the Shi`ites of the Muslim world must resolve centuries old grievances and differences. When that happens, they would have achieved the first condition of peaceful coexistence. The breakup of Iraq will, however, signals the chronic nature of the problem and the incompetence of Muslim scholars and leaders. Should this be the end result, the military invasion of Iraq would be added to the West’s list of miscalculations and deadly interventions in the Muslim world. If the Iraqis and Muslims survive these challenges, their accomplishment will undoubtedly signal a new political and intellectual maturity worthy of its demographic, historical, and civilizational heritage.
There are emerging indications that many Muslim leaders are aware of this historical time and the responsibilities that come with it. Recently, the influential International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS) has called for an international gathering of “religious authorities of different Muslim sects to probe means of closing the Muslim ranks and uprooting sectarianism.” Soon after the announcement, the Iranian religious supreme leader threw his weight behind the proposal. The IUMS was pleased and released a statement that said in part: “”Khamenei extolled the call by the Dublin-based IUMS and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to organize a conference bringing together religious authorities of the different Muslim sects with the aim of clarifying the religious stance on such practices and ending such malicious crimes.”
These developments offer Muslims and the West (especially the USA) a way out. The US needs to avert a total civil war in Iraq. Muslims want to pacify a region that is sliding towards extremism. These converging interests may be the only formula that will bring about stability to Iraq, offer a way out for the US from an ill-conceived and ill-executed unnecessary war, and initiate fundamental political transformation in the wider Muslim world. For that to happen, the US administration must drop its simplistic approach of looking at the world through a lens that reflects only black and white characterization of the reality. It must start meaningful and serious conversations with all parties involved. Dealing only with the so-called “moderate” regimes is seen by Muslim masses as a continued support for tyranny, corruption, and authoritarianism. It is more productive to respect the will of the people even if that may seem to bring about unfriendly regimes to power than to support non-representative figures. It is natural that people whose choices were respected will be more respectful of the choices of others. The West needs to adopt long-term policies and diplomacy that transcend friendly (moderate) personalities who are undoubtedly outlasted, one way or another, by the people.
(ResearchSEA)